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# REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### SUBCOMMITTEE ON

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

### NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

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In our study, we canvassed key U.S. embassies and their constituent posts in all geographic areas, and we met with a number of groups in the Department to obtain first-hand views as to the operation of both the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act as they affect the conduct of foreign relations. We have communicated our recommendations as to possible legislative changes to the Justice Department, the agency responsible for coordinating the over-all position of the Executive Branch in this matter. I would be happy to meet with you and your staff to review the findings of our study and discuss the conclusions that we have drawn.

You may already be familiar with the measures we have implemented to improve security protection afforded to Congressional delegations traveling in foreign countries. We have made it a standard practice to request a threat assessment from our posts describing the current security situation in a country to be visited by any member of the U.S. Congress. These threat assessments are periodically updated during the time a delegation may be out of the country, and their contents are shared with the members of the delegation before their departure and during the time of their actual visit. Our Office of Security in the Department accumulates a great deal of information regarding potentially unstable situations abroad and, in cooperation with the Office of Congressional Relations, promptly notifies any Congressional delegation about dangerous situations that may arise during the course of a Congressional visit. In addition, we have also considered providing mobile communications equipment to Congressional delegations that may be traveling to remote or isolated areas of the world, and we have undertaken to provide such equipment on at least one occasion.

With regard to training opportunities for consular officers, we have employed the Jonestown experience specifically as a case study for some advanced consular training exercises. From time to time, consular officers have also been introduced to the psychological aspects of various mind control techniques with specific attention to the implications of these methods for the provision of normal consular services. We have generally endeavored to heighten the awareness of our consular officers to Jonestown situations, and we have encouraged closer coordination between consular officers in the field and their political and economic counterparts.

Prior to the Jonestown episode, the Department had begun a re-organization of its Office of Overseas Citizens Services. That re-organization has now been completed, and a number of important changes have been made to enable the Department to respond more effectively to situations involving the protection and assistance of U.S. citizens abroad. A Citizens Emergency Center has been established to provide emergency consular assistance, and the Office of Citizens Consular Services has been re-organized on a regional basis so as to improve coordination between consular officials and the regional officers with whom they must often deal.

I hope that this review of the programs inaugurated by the Department since the Jonestown event has been helpful. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter with you in greater depth, and to learn your views as to any further measures that you might consider advisable.

Sincerely yours,

MATTHEW NIMETZ.

Mr. ROYER. If we may, to conserve time I would like Ms. Speier to come up at the same time because she will be the next person testifying. So Jackie, if you would come up, too.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you.

Welcome, Mr. Holsinger. We are pleased to have you with us. If you will, please proceed.

#### STATEMENT OF JOE HOLSINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE LATE REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN

Mr. HOLSINGER. This is a day I was not sure would ever happen, to be able to present this information today or these questions. But I am gratified that it has come about.



I would first like to express my appreciation to Chairman Fascell for convening these oversight hearings. I know that Leo Ryan had the highest personal regard for Mr. Fascell, whom he considered to be his mentor on this committee, as well as his very good friend.

I also want to thank Representative Bill Royer for his role in pressing for these hearings. His efforts have earned him the respect of everyone who was touched by the tragedy in Guyana in November 1978.

It is an irony of fate that this subcommittee is one on which Leo Ryan served and worked closely with members. I was going to say some of whom are here today, but we seem to have a problem as far as who could attend today.

The conduct of this open congressional hearing can help to determine if our Government withheld vital information from Representative Ryan and if his death and the death of over 900 persons could have been averted.

Leo went to Guyana in a last ditch effort to determine the validity of serious charges made about Jim Jones and the People's Temple in Jonestown. Representative Ryan had received detailed allegations that at least some of the more than 900 Americans there were being held against their will under brutal and inhuman circumstances. He would not have led a congressional delegation there if the facts could have been determined any other way.

Representative Royer's office has informed me that the purpose of these oversight hearings is to determine what the State Department has done to implement the recommendations contained in the Foreign Affairs Committee staff report and the State Department report on the performance of the State Department in the Jonestown matter.

The recommendations appear to be useful and, if implemented properly, they should improve the quality of State Department performance overseas. One of the most difficult areas is that of review of exemption provisions under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act, which Representative Royer alluded to. It is clear that the Privacy Act was interpreted by the State Department to deny Representative Ryan access to pertinent information concerning Jim Jones and the People's Temple in Guyana.

It is also clear that the Freedom of Information Act was interpreted by State Department personnel in such a way as to provide complete access to Jim Jones about inquiries or actions concerning Jones and the People's Temple. Our experience in the Ryan office in that regard is detailed in the attached news story in the San Mateo Times of December 6, 1979, "Somehow the Word Would Get to People's Temple," which is attached as exhibit A, and I think there is a lot of information in that news story which has not been generally known elsewhere outside the San Mateo Times area.<sup>1</sup>

That free flow of information to Jones from the State Department, and the reasons for it, have never been properly addressed. Was it de facto State Department policy or was it the work of a few key officials who had close ties to Jim Jones?

A major issue that has escaped scrutiny is the emphasis placed by the State Department on promoting American commercial interests overseas as its first priority, to the detriment of the problems of individual U.S. citizens abroad. That issue was raised by Representative Paul McCloskey in an interview published in the San Mateo Times on

<sup>1</sup> Exhibits A through E are retained in committee files.

December 8, 1978, "McCloskey Slams State Department," exhibit B as attached.

The following is an excerpt from that news story:

A congressional investigation of the Jonestown massacre is likely to show that the U.S. State Department was more concerned with promoting exportation of natural resources from Guyana than exposing injustices within Peoples Temple or protecting Americans visiting that country, Representative Paul McCloskey told the Times Thursday.

The Republican congressman from Menlo Park who had worked with his slain colleague, Representative Leo J. Ryan, for State Department intervention in the Jonestown commune, stated: "I think an investigation will bring out that the Guyanese Government had a relationship with (the Reverend Jim) Jones and that the U.S. Embassy (in Georgetown) knew about it, accepted it and didn't try to intrude. Based on my dealings with the State Department, I think it is apparent that the department was more concerned with getting along with the Guyanese \* \* \* and promoting exports from that country than it was in protecting U.S. citizens."

The most important mineral resources in Guyana are bauxite and manganese. Gold and diamonds are also mined. Bauxite is the principal source of aluminum.

I should say also that Jackie Speier's research before Leo went down to Guyana indicated that up until that time, at least until 1977, reports were that 91 percent of the world's current supply of bauxite was coming from Guyana.

Going back to the article,

McCloskey said it is the "inherent mission" of all U.S. embassies, as representatives of the President, to place more emphasis on maintaining an amiable relationship with a host country and promoting exports than looking after the interests of citizens abroad.

He said it is his hope that the investigation will result in an order by the House International Relations Committee that embassies take a "stronger position on the well-being of Americans."

That is the end of the quotation from the news article. I find nothing in the State Department recommendations that remotely touches on this matter.

However, one of the State Department recommendations most pertinent to the Guyana tragedy was item G(1) which stated, and this is a quotation from the report,

The Department should strengthen its support for congressional delegations travelling overseas. We endorse the current efforts of the Department to provide: (1) more definitive threat assessments in areas to be visited by Congressional groups.

Threat assessments, to be effective, must necessarily include current intelligence data from the area involved. The question is whether the results of such intelligence data will be shared with congressional delegations or withheld from them. The record shows that no such intelligence data was made available to Leo Ryan concerning Guyana.

I should also repeat that there were no warnings from the State Department to Leo Ryan. At first the State Department said they had warned Leo. They later retracted that. The impression was made first that he had been warned, and many people in this country believed it. They were later forced to retract it, and I want that on the record.

In fact, the State Department denied knowledge of any intelligence data concerning the People's Temple in Guyana in its report of December 13, 1978 from Douglas Bennet, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to Representative Clement Zablocki, chairman of the

International Relations Committee. Question No. 8 from Chairman Zablocki asked:

Were the activities of the Peoples' Temple Church investigated by the FBI and/or other U.S. Government agencies and, if so, were their findings made available to the Department of State?

The State Department response was:

The Department of Justice has informed the Department that it conducted no investigations of the Peoples' Temple prior to the death of Congressman Ryan. We have been informed that the Federal Communications Commission investigated use of amateur radio stations by the Peoples' Temple to determine whether that use violated the Federal Communications Act of 1934.

The Department is unaware of any other investigations that may have been conducted by other U.S. Government agencies of the Peoples' Temple or its activities other than the single report of the Customs investigation noted in our response to question No. 7 above.

I submit that response can be true only if you believe that U.S. Government intelligence operations in Guyana were completely shielded from the State Department. Our Government did have an intelligence presence in Guyana prior to Leo Ryan's trip there. I know that an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency witnessed his death. On the afternoon of November 18, 1978, I received two phone calls in California from Washington, D.C. The first was from the Caribbean desk at the State Department. I had been in touch with them several times that day because of my concern over Leo's presence at Jonestown and the potential danger there.

The State Department caller told me that they had just received a report from the American Embassy in Georgetown of a shooting incident at the Port Kaituma airstrip. The report said that 3 people had been killed and 15 wounded, and that Representative Ryan may have been one of those killed.

Within 15 minutes, I had a second phone call, this time from a member of the White House staff whom I know personally. He told me that five people had been killed, including Leo. When I said that his information differed from that which I just received from the State Department, he responded, "Joe, our information is correct. We have a CIA report from the scene."

The White House aide then asked my assistance in identifying the other four persons by describing their roles. Because of my familiarity with the mission, I was able to identify Don Harris as the TV newscaster, Bob Brown as the TV cameraman, and Greg Robinson as the still photographer.

Since a CIA agent was present at the assassination of Congressman Ryan, it seems reasonable to assume that our Government had received prior reports on the People's Temple.

Further confirmation of CIA activities in Guyana are contained in a San Mateo Times news story of December 14, 1979, "CIA Agent Witnessed Jonestown Mass Suicide," exhibit C as attached. I have been informed that House rules forbid specific charges against named individuals in open session, but I am ready to discuss such charges against more than one individual in executive session if this committee chooses to hear them.

I believe that the tragic consequences of withholding intelligence data from Leo Ryan in Guyana should serve as a warning to all future congressional delegations abroad. Unless the Congress insists on the inclusion of such data in State Department threat assessments, the ability of Congress to fulfill its factfinding and investigative responsibilities will be at the mercy of the executive branch of the Government.

It also appears that existing law may have been broken by the Central Intelligence Agency in failing to report to the appropriate committees in Congress on its covert activities in Guyana. In December 1974, as an amendment to the Foreign Aid Act, Congress approved a provision sponsored by Harold Hughes of Iowa in the Senate and by Leo Ryan of California in the House. This is what it said:

No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other act may be expended by or on behalf of the CIA for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

The CIA did have an operation in Guyana in addition to the obtaining of necessary intelligence. I charge that that operation was specifically designed to support the Government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, and there are credible reports that it included covert support for Jim Jones as an ally of Forbes Burnham. Specifically, the People's Temple provided funds to the Burnham group and also acted as a terrorist organization to intimidate the opponents of the Burnham regime. And the Burnham government was cooperative with our commercial interests and with the policy of the U.S. State Department in promoting the exportation of natural resources from Guyana.

It seems almost certain now that our intelligence sources were aware that charges that American citizens were being held in bondage were true, and that they allowed that condition to continue in the interest of their mission. They also withheld that information from Members of Congress, including Leo Ryan, and from desperate relatives who pleaded for Government assistance for their loved ones. The Department of State consistently reassured such relatives that all was well in Jonestown. A typical example is the State Department response of June 16, 1978, to Sherwin Harris of Lafayette, Calif., exhibit D.

I would like to say that if anyone can read that letter to Sherwin Harris and in any way tie it to its response by Hodding Carter, it does not wash. It is typical of the responses concerned relatives got.

By the time that Leo Ryan led the congressional delegation to Guyana in November 1978, the difficult question posed for our Government was whether or not it should admit to Ryan that one, a covert intelligence operation existed in Guyana that had not been reported to appropriate committees in Congress as required by law. I would like to add at this point that Leo was a member of the Oversight Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that he would have been one of those to whom the CIA would have reported about a covert operation in Guyana. They knew of his interest in the People's Temple. It seems possible to me the reason they did not report that operation may have been because Leo was one of the coauthors of Hughes-Ryan and sat on that committee.



Item two, American citizens were being held in Jonestown against their will. And item three, our Government was using Jim Jones as an ally of the Burnham government to maintain its control of Guyana.

Someone, or some group, made the decision to "stonewall" the Ryan delegation. That was a fatal mistake, although at the time it must have appeared that Leo's mission would fail since it was obvious that neither our Government, the Government of Guyana nor Jim Jones wanted him in Guyana, or especially in Jonestown. Under those circumstances, it appeared very unlikely that one lone Congressman would be able to "kick down the doors," to use one of Leo's pet phrases.

On the other hand, it was likely that if Leo Ryan had been given intelligence data indicating that American citizens were being held against their will under brutal circumstances, he would have used that information with the appropriate committee in Congress to force our Government to free those people. Leo would not have had to go to Guyana. And all those deaths would have been averted.

News accounts from Georgetown at the time of the Ryan mission there said that Leo was winning the media or public opinion battle against Jim Jones. Before Leo's departure for Guyana, he and I discussed his plan to go up to the gates of Jonestown, in the presence of the media, and request permission to enter. If such permission were refused, Leo would then return to Congress with proof that Jonestown was a closed settlement. If he was allowed to enter, he intended to assess the situation there fairly, but to insist on talking alone to specific people and to personally escort anyone out who wished to leave.

When it became obvious that Leo Ryan was going to Jonestown even without prior agreement by Jim Jones, our Government had its last chance to disclose the true nature of the situation there to Leo. Someone decided at this juncture to take the chance that Jones would be able to put on a show that would convince the Ryan group that all was well in Jonestown. It seems incredible to me that our Government, knowing what it did about the situation inside Jonestown and the potential for violence there, would take that chance. It is a terribly harsh question as ask, but is it possible that even the terrible tragedy that occurred was preferred over disclosure of our covert operation in Guyana?

In reviewing the adequacy of the recommendations from the State Department, the most significant omission is that of the presence of CIA personnel in key roles within the State Department. Their existence is known to our allies and to our potential enemies alike. It is a secret only from the American public. I believe that the CIA serves a vital and essential purpose in our national interest. I also understand that its personnel operate under orders from the National Security Agency and the President. Their work is often dangerous and they must be protected. It may be necessary under some circumstances for CIA personnel to use the cover of the State Department employees. However, such usage should be kept to an absolute minimum since it can obviously create radical mutations in policy and endanger the lives of American citizens abroad unless great care is taken.

If, as seems probable, our State Department policy toward the People's Temple and Guyana was dominated by the CIA operations there, the Department's laxness and indifference to petitions and complaints from refugees, or defectors as they're sometimes called, and from Concerned Relatives becomes more understandable.

I should say parenthetically I cannot believe the State Department has made all the errors they claim to have made. Every time something is brought to them, they say we made another error. If that's an example of their errors, we have one hell of a State Department.

Some of the major petitions and affidavits which were ignored or "lost" included one, the Concerned Relatives petition of May 10, 1978, to the Secretary of State, which included sworn notarized affidavits concerning the abuse of human rights by Jones. Two, the April 10, 1978, affidavit of Yolanda D. A. Crawford, a People's Temple defector, describing beatings and abuses in Jonestown. Three, the affidavits of May and June 1978 by Debbie Blakey describing suicide rehearsals and other serious charges.

The State Department's response of June 26, 1978, to Ambassador Burke's telegram of June 6, 1978, was covered in the State Department review and the investigative report by the Foreign Affairs Committee staff. A situation occurred, and I am departing from my text, where the Ambassador sent a request up to the State Department saying that he wanted to go to the Government of Guyana and ask permission for them and suggest to them that they exercise greater police powers and greater authority in Jonestown, in fact recommended that that be done. That came to the State Department. His message was clear. The response was clear. But the State Department response to that telegram of June 6, 1978, was a clear rejection of Burke's request for permission to discuss the Jonestown situation with the Government of Guyana. It seems quite possible in retrospect that this rejection was influenced by intelligence agency considerations.

And going back again, some of these reports criticized Ambassador Burke for not coming back and arguing with his superiors. He sent a very clear request in. They rejected it. Someone blamed Burke for not fighting harder against the rejection of his superiors. That does not wash with me at all. I understand this was the first time that Burke had made such a request concerning Jonestown. It was sent up to the seventh floor of the State Department and that response was drafted upstairs with great care. I don't think it is any accident at all.

Some knowledgeable observers may argue that the deaths of Leo Ryan, the media members, and over 900 American residents of Jonestown may be the price we had to pay to keep control of Guyana. Sort of a "that's war, folks, that's the way it is" attitude. But what if Guyana falls anyway, and soon? That specter was raised in a news article from London and published in the San Francisco Chronicle on December 9, 1979, "Guyana May Be the Next to Fall." That is exhibit E.

That article detailed the desperate economic plight of the Guyanese people and their growing opposition, now estimated at 75 to 80 percent, to the Burnham Government. It also discussed the use of violence by another U.S.-based pseudo-religious group. This group, "The House of Israel," appears to be the strong-arm successor to the People's Temple in support of Burnham. If the tragedy at Jonestown was in fact allowed to happen to protect the secrecy of our intelligence operations in Guyana, the ultimate tragedy when Guyana falls will be that it was in vain.

I submit that our Government policy in the underdeveloped countries in the Caribbean is fatally flawed if it is based solely on the protection of U.S. commercial interests. We must be more supportive to the native economies in the Caribbean if we are to maintain our sphere of influence against Cuba and Russia.

Grenada, a small island nation near Guyana, has already been taken into the Communist sphere of influence, despite our support for the government of Sir Eric Gairy, which fell in March 1979. That was another intelligence-supported operation, the government of Gairy. It is of interest to note that Gairy and Jim Jones were close enough for Gairy to visit Jones at the People's Temple in San Francisco prior to Jones' departure to Guyana. A photograph of the two together appears in a book, "The Suicide Cult," written by a San Francisco Chronicle reporter, Ron Javers.

It has been reported that Jim Jones had planned to escape to Grenada with a select group of supporters following the mass murders in Jonestown. And I should state here also in September 1978, a private investigator in Jonestown counted 1,100 passports there; 900 people's bodies were found. There were a few missing, like between 900 and 1,100.

Jones did not intend to die in Jonestown. No paraffin tests were ever made to determine if he had fired a gun. It should also be noted here, it is now known that more than \$1 million of People's Temple money was deposited in a Grenada bank.

It should also be noted here that the pathology report by the Guyanese coroner showed that a high percentage of the victims examined were injected in the back with the poison. The proof was the blisters on the backs at the point of injection. And if we don't care too much about events of people who commit suicide, and we put those aside, if we thought a lot more of those were murders, it would be harder to forget about it. So I wonder about the accuracy of the reporting, or the lack of accuracy from the scene.

We also know that an undetermined number of Jonestown residents showed up in Grenada following the Jonestown tragedy. And the *Marcelline*, Jim's boat, was over there.

My reason for going beyond a discussion of the recommendations by the State Department is that the fault may be with Government policy rather than with the day-to-day conduct of State Department employees. When a tragedy of this magnitude occurs, we should do more, much more, than be content with a surface examination of individual conduct.

I realize that many of the matters I have discussed today are beyond the purview of this subcommittee, or in fact of any standing committee of the Congress. For that reason, I ask now for the formation of a special House committee with full power to investigate all aspects of the Jonestown tragedy, including its impact on our foreign policy and our relations with neighboring nations in the Caribbean.

Some of the questions to be addressed by such a select committee would include the following:

One, is it State Department policy to make protection of American commercial interests abroad its top priority at the expense of the safety of American citizens?

Two, to what extent is the CIA used to promote and protect American commercial interests abroad, in addition to its normal functions



of gathering intelligence? Does such protection result in the creation of animosity toward our country by citizens of these nations?

Three, did our Government use Jones and the People's Temple to support the Burnham government? If so, was the purpose to protect the commercial export of raw materials such as bauxite and manganese?

Four, were members of our intelligence agencies serving in key positions in our Embassy in Guyana and in the State Department in Washington, D.C., and were they directed by our Government to use those positions to control State Department conduct regarding complaints against the People's Temple?

Five, did our Government knowingly acquiesce in the intolerable conditions of bondage at Jonestown in order to maintain control of the Guyanese Government?

Six, was our Government, through its intelligence operation, fully aware of the arms in Jonestown and the potential for violence there? If so, why did it fail to insist on armed protection by the Guyanese Government for the Ryan mission? Was Leo Ryan set up for murder?

Seven, did a member of the CIA, who was also a State Department official, go back into Jonestown after the killings at Port Kaituma and witness the mass murder-suicide scene there, as reported in the San Mateo Times? If so, why?

Eight, who killed Jim Jones and why?

Nine, has the administration used "national security" as an excuse to cover up the monumental error of withholding vital information from Leo Ryan concerning Jim Jones and the People's Temple in Jonestown, an error that led directly to the tragedy?

I thank you for the opportunity to present this statement in an open hearing before this committee. My personal feelings about the tragic death of my good friend, Leo Ryan, are obvious. He is gone, but I believe that we should now proceed to examine fully the causes of this tragedy and to insure that the errors leading to it are corrected for the good of our Nation.

Thank you very much.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Holsinger. The testimony, I'm sure we all feel and will continue to feel, has made an important contribution to an ongoing investigation.

Mr. ROYER, do you have any questions?

Mr. ROYER. Mr. Chairman, I think at this point I would like to call on Ms. Jackie Speier. If there are questions after she testifies, while they are both here we can ask them. But I would like her to proceed now if she may.

Mr. IRELAND. If you will, Ms. Speier, please proceed.

#### **STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE K. SPEIER, LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE LATE REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN**

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, a little more than a year ago I sat in the chairman of this committee's office and together we grieved, in fact we cried because we'd lost a friend and a colleague in the man of the late Congressman Leo J. Ryan. During our meeting together, Chairman Fascell promised me that he would do whatever was necessary to get the answers to the questions that had gone unanswered. I urged him to hold public hearings on

the tragedy. He said he would call hearings if they were warranted. I am grateful to him for calling this hearing today. As a congressional assistant for 5 years, I sat in this room many times and marveled at the chairman's depth of perception and extensive knowledge regarding foreign policy. I thank him, the members of this committee, and the staff for the opportunity to speak before you today.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Congressman Bill Royer who has shown a responsiveness to his constituents in his efforts to arrange these hearings.

Since the tragic events of November 18, 1978, forums all across the country and in fact around the world have challenged spokespersons to speculate as to why Jonestown happened. The Washington community has not been excluded from this discussion. Rather, both the Congress and the executive branch conducted hearings and investigations into the Jonestown tragedy. I have read the documents prepared by the State Department and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and cooperated fully with both of these investigations. Without question, the efforts of these groups were genuine. Both investigative teams took their mandate seriously and conducted the inquiries in a highly professional manner. The recommendations offered were adequate, but I respectfully submit that they address the symptoms and not the ailment.

The focus of this hearing is to monitor and evaluate the extent to which the State Department has effectuated the recommendations enumerated in the Foreign Affairs Committee report and the State Department report. I am not prepared, nor am I qualified, to respond to that line of questioning. Certainly State Department officials are the only persons who can address that question. What's more, I find such questioning somewhat premature.

We still have not received plausible explanations regarding the performance of State before, during, and after the tragedy. A U.S. Congressman, and over 900 people lost their lives in Guyana and the conclusions reached indicate that:

1. The U.S. Embassy in Guyana "did not demonstrate adequate initiative, sensitive reaction, and appreciation of progressively mounting indications of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown."
  2. "There was a laxness in State Department procedures for distributing certain important documents relative to People's Temple thereby inhibiting the opportunity for taking appropriate action."
- Both these quotations are from the House Foreign Affairs Committee report on pages 29 and 31.

We lost a U.S. Congressman and 900 Americans and all we say is that our Embassy did not "demonstrate initiative or sensitivity" and the State Department was "lax." Such an evaluation of the State Department's performance is incomplete and oversimplified. And yet, with these inconclusive results, recommendations have been made which the State Department has taken steps to implement. In my mind it is a classic case of the cart before the horse.

In my estimation the State Department failed in three respects regarding the Codel trip. The Department failed in its duty to warn, its duty to investigate, and its duty to inform.

The ramifications of these hearings far exceed whether or not we will ultimately find out why the Jonestown tragedy occurred. The

issue here cuts to the quick of what kind of relationship exists between the State Department and the Congress.

Is full disclosure by State Department to the Congress presumed or even anticipated? "Duty to warn." Is our Embassy's allegiance in a foreign country first to the foreign government or to the Congress and the American people? "Duty to investigate." Is the relationship between Congress and the State Department cooperative or adversative? "Duty to inform."

I will discuss the "duty to warn." In the letter from Matthew Nimetz to Chairman Rodino of the Judiciary Committee on November 21, 1979, Nimetz outlines the steps which have been implemented in the aftermath of the Guyana tragedy and the recommendations of the various reports. I quote:

We have made it a standard practice to request a threat assessment from our posts describing the current security situation in a country to be visited \* \* \* The contents (of the threat assessments) are shared with the members of the delegation before their departure.

Had this guideline been in effect when we made the trip to Guyana, I am certain the threat assessment would have been reported as "benign" by the State Department. State never shared with the congressional delegation any of the information and reports which it had in its files for over 1 year before our trip which pointed to a possible illegal export of up to 170 guns from California to Jonestown. The U.S. Customs Service, August 26, 1977, made that report. It was received by the State Department Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on September 6, 1977.

I must presume State Department did not consider such gun running to be "threatening." Further, we were not even given the opportunity to make our own threat assessment on a personal level because we were not privy to that vital information. A State Department spokesman in December 1978, 1 month after the tragedy, still maintained there was no potential violence in State's view and was quoted as saying:

We did not specifically advise Congressman Ryan with respect to potential violence \* \* \* There was no prior instance, known or alleged, of use of physical violence against a visitor.

That was reported in the Redwood City Tribune, Redwood City, Calif., December 16, 1978.

At this time I would like to show a visual example of the violence that State Department did not expect, because there was no prior history. This bullet was removed from my arm 2 months ago. The FBI has subsequently run ballistics tests on it.

The State Department did not anticipate violence although they were put on notice not just once, by the Customs Service report, but at least twice about the armed camp environment at Jonestown.

The second instance refers to an affidavit received in June 1978 by the State Department from Deborah Layton Blakey in which she testifies the "settlement swarming with armed guards," "persons approximately 50 in number would arm themselves with rifles." The affidavit also described white night suicide trials, brutality and severe working and subsistence conditions. Not only were these charges made in a formal affidavit to the State Department in June 1978, they were

also communicated firsthand to the consular officer in Guyana. He suggested Blakey contact the Justice Department.

Had the consular officer no responsibility to make an inquiry regarding the charges leveled? Had he no responsibility to inform the Justice Department himself?

The duty to investigate. The Foreign Affairs Committee report makes the statement, "The Embassy did not have an investigative or judicial function." I submit that the treaty we signed with the United Kingdom on June 6, 1951, and which continues to be the controlling document regarding our relationship with the Government of Guyana today specifically provides that our consular officers have investigating powers. In 3 UST 3439, part V, Protection of Nationals, article 15, it states:

A consular officer shall be entitled within his district to: (a) interview, communicate with and advise any national of the sending state; (b) inquire into any incidents, repeat, inquire into any incidents which have occurred affecting the interests of any such national.

Proper interpretation of this section by our Embassy officials in Guyana could have provided them with persuasive authority to investigate the charges made by Deborah Layton Blakey and others about the conditions in Jonestown and the potential for violence.

At every junction within the State Department framework in Washington and in Guyana, officials failed to act. They failed to act not out of ignorance but with full knowledge of possible significant criminal activity by Jim Jones. The failure of State Department in performing its responsibilities is not the result of any lack of power to act. The treaty clearly provides for such an action.

I do not believe the unresponsiveness of State to make inquiries regarding the Blakey affidavit or the numerous letters from concerned relatives is the result of a bureaucratic foulup of the documents never reaching the appropriate officials in State. We have the admission of the consular officer in charge at Georgetown, who accompanied Blakey to New York, that he was aware of her concerns and charges. The Blakey defection occurred in May; the Blakey affidavit was filed in June. The Codel departed in November. No action was ever taken by the State Department or the Embassy to verify the charges made by Blakey. It was assumed, erroneously by both Congressman Ryan and myself that the affidavit had been reviewed and no evidence found to support the charges. We presumed, what a congressional delegation relying on assistance from State would have presumed, that the State Department was doing its job. We still do not know today why the affidavit did not prompt a full investigation. I can only speculate that: (1) the charges were already known to be true; (2) the Jonestown "problem" did not merit priority consideration by State; or (3) an investigation would somehow jeopardize the U.S. economic or political relationship with Guyana.

Until we can determine what the motivation was for the "non-action," making recommendations in an attempt to avert another tragedy such as Jonestown is an exercise in futility.

The duty to inform. Whether or not a cooperative relationship exists between the State Department and Congress must be assessed more specifically.

Congressman Ryan and I met with Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Viron P. Vaky and other State Department offi-



cials in September 1978 to discuss the Congressman's interest in traveling to Guyana in November 1978. State Department was kept advised on an almost daily basis as the trip became more defined. During October and the first 2 weeks of November, the Guyana desk officer was consulted daily and informed by me regarding every new development of the trip including the possible media coverage. My relationship with State could only be described as cooperative and candid.

On the other hand, the Congressman's efforts as well as mine to obtain information and assistance were consistently thwarted or frustrated.

In the days that followed the tragedy, the State Department complied with the Foreign Affairs Committee requests and handed over 900 documents regarding the People's Temple in Guyana—I repeat, 900 documents. In our requests for information from State we were never once told of the 900 documents the Department had on the temple and furthermore we were never given access to those documents.

Had we had the opportunity to review the documents, even a limited number of them, we might have "located" the U.S. Customs Service report regarding the suspected 170 guns in Jonestown, a report State had "misplaced" prior to the congressional trip.

Had we been afforded a cursory review, we would have realized that the Blakey affidavit of June 1978 was never acted upon.

The question still haunts me today. Why was critical, life and death information regarding the People's Temple hidden from the view of the congressional delegation before the trip? Was the State Department fearful that we would discover that it had been wantonly negligent in protecting American citizens abroad in Guyana?

If the relationship between the Congress and State Department is indeed cooperative and not adversative, I implore this committee to seek the answers to these unanswered questions.

The late Congressman Leo Ryan was eulogized by many of his colleagues after his death for his courage and tenacious spirit in seeking out the truth regardless of the obstacles or political ramifications. I trust that the members of the International Operations Subcommittee will continue in his spirit of leadership and representation of the American people by seeking the whole truth about the Jonestown tragedy.

It is my firm belief that the State Department must share heavily in the responsibility for the deaths of Leo Ryan and the 900 Americans in Guyana. I cannot be confident in our Government's protection of Americans abroad or in our State Department until the whole truth about the Jonestown tragedy is finally exposed. Our lives depend on it.

Thank you.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Ms. Speier.

Mr. Royer, would you care to ask questions?

Mr. ROYER. Thank you very much. I think you can feel, as I do, from the testimony received by both these people that their testimony sets forth some very serious questions which I believe we are going to have to ask the State Department on March 4.

I would like to ask Jackie first of all if she remembers, at any point during the briefing periods, requesting any information that State might have pertaining to the overall situation in Guyana?

Ms. SPEIER. There were constant requests made for information. The only information which was shared with us was superficial telegrams

and cables transmitted from the State Department to Georgetown and from Georgetown to the State Department. Most of those cables dealt with just the preliminary aspects of the trip, nothing of any substance.

Mr. ROYER. I am thinking more specifically of some of the charges made by Concerned Relatives, such as the Blakey affidavit and other information that was given to State. Was it your thought to ask for information as to whether that affidavit had been reviewed by the State Department, or did they just give you the impression that it had been reviewed?

Ms. SPEIER. The impression we had was the affidavit had been reviewed. Our information regarding that affidavit did not come from State Department. They were very closed-mouth in their dealings with us. They provided us only with technical assistance about making the trip, technical information in terms of what kind of clothing to wear, what kind of weather we would be having, what kind of difficulties we would encounter regarding transportation.

Mr. ROYER. What about the information from either of you pertaining to the November 7 visit? To me, that seems to be a critical visit.

Mr. HOLSINGER. Before that, your first question, we made many inquiries on behalf of Concerned Relatives, the specific cases, and the answer would come back from the State Department that they had gone out and visited, the consular officer had visited and found that everything was fine. All we ever got back was everything is OK.

We found out later that the consular officer would advise Jones and the People's Temple in advance who he was going to talk to, what he was going to say and where he would talk to them. They set it up like a stage, and then when they got there, those things would happen just like that. People were warned in advance that he was coming and this is what he was going to say, this is how he was going to act, and in effect, intimating that the consular office was in league with the People's Temple. People were afraid because everything that they were told would happen happened, and here was Jim Jones apparently controlling the consular officer or Embassy people down there, and they were afraid that Jones had that power, and I questioned why. In other words, it was a setup, Mr. Royer.

When we would inquire, they would set it up in such a staging and come back with a prearranged staging, and when they got back, they would say everything is benign, everything is fine.

As far as the November 7 thing is concerned, when I found out afterward about that and the fact that it had not been transmitted, I could not believe that when Leo came down there and Jackie, having had that visit, that they would not have informed the congressional delegation and the leader of that delegation specifically of what they later put in their report.

I think it would take some tall talking to convince anyone that that information was not deliberately withheld from Congressman Ryan, but I want to find out why they did it and who ordered them to withhold it.

Mr. ROYER. As I understand it, both of the gentlemen who were on the tour of Jonestown were in on the last briefing, as I understand it, with you before you left?

Ms. SPEIER. That's correct.

Mr. ROYER. And their response was that they didn't give you the information because you didn't ask for it?

Ms. SPEIER. We couldn't ask for information we did not know existed, and that kind of response to any of our inquiries—

Mr. ROYER. I think for the record, what you are indicating is you had no knowledge of the November 7 tour before hearing about it later on?

Ms. SPEIER. No, that is not correct. When we had our first briefing at the Embassy in Georgetown, there was reference made to the fact that Doug Ellice had just returned from a trip to the Jonestown settlement a week before, and that Jim Jones appeared to be not feeling very well. But that is the extent of the information.

I might also add that during that briefing at the Embassy, Mr. Dwyer showed slides of the Jonestown settlement to give us a preview of what we would be seeing. They were helpful, but the most significant frame in the slides that were shown was a slide that was taken of Dick Dwyer arm in arm with Jim Jones and Marcelline Jones. With the kind of intimidation that was rampant in that settlement and for any of the adherents to Jim Jones who would have watched that picture being taken, it was clearly a situation where it appeared that they were very close friends, that there was an amicable relationship there, and in my estimation the objectivity that was absolutely necessary for any of our consular officers in going to Jonestown and talking to the young people there was totally destroyed by a picture such as that.

Mr. ROYER. I have one last question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Holsinger, there are, in your remarks, references to the CIA, but you don't clearly indicate whether you feel that any of their work had to do with Jonestown itself. Are you inferring that it was broader than what you have suggested in here? I get the feeling you feel they were there, but I don't get the feeling that you have indicated specifically that they were particularly aware of all of the concerns.

Is that a misinterpretation?

Mr. HOLSINGER. I would like to make that clear, then, for the record. It is my belief, based upon what I found out and what I have here, that our intelligence agencies, whether it was the CIA or another branch of our intelligence service, had a covert operation there, more than just gathering intelligence. If you refer to the article in the Chronicle, "Guyana May Be the Next To Fall," you will find we had a very active agency there in the mid-1960's. We installed the Forbes Burnham government in our own interest. We have had an ongoing operation there, and I specifically say that our Central Intelligence Agency did probably, under direction, work with Jim Jones to support the government of Burnham, to support that, to support our commercial interests and our position there, that they had an active operation, that they knew about Jonestown, they had information that what was happening there was true, and that what happened because of all of this was they controlled not only operations in Georgetown and Guyana, but they had a heavy hand in the State Department in controlling State Department reaction in Washington, D.C., to our inquiries about the People's Temple in Jonestown.

I think this was an intelligence operation from beginning to end, and it ended in disaster.

Mr. ROYER. But in your opinion, it is an operation you found out about later, and therefore at no time prior to the trip did you ask for the intelligence information from either the CIA or—



Mr. HOLSINGER. We had no idea it was anything other than what it seemed on the surface. We were not even thinking in terms of an intelligence operation there. We had no such evidence. Leo simply did not think in those terms and was not even aware. He was concerned with the welfare of individuals there, and we had no way of knowing that there might be overriding national interests.

I would like to say in the end that we have shown a great concern for human rights throughout the world in other nations. We have shown concerns for some human rights for citizens abroad, as in Iran. It seems to me our State Department is rather selective in when it chooses to be concerned about human rights and when it does not.

I would like to point out that no one connected with the Georgetown Embassy operation was ever rebuked, it was never put on their record they were rebuked for having taken any actions wrong. I have pictures of them being commended for their actions down there.

Obviously, it was a very difficult circumstance, that you have the people involved all promoted or commended and no one even rebuked. It seems to me that when you have this kind of disaster of this magnitude, to promote and commend everyone involved with it does not speak very well of a real investigation of the Department, of its own procedures.

Mr. IRELAND. If I could pursue a point, Ms. Speier, about the reports that you got back from the State Department, well, "we didn't give them any indication because they didn't ask," which certainly was a source of great frustration to all of us and all of you, I'm sure.

First of all, in the slide presentation that you received, did you know or could you tell or did you later find out when those slides were taken? How long before your visit had the slides been taken? Had they been taken over a period of a year or on that November 7 visit? What were they purported to be?

Ms. SPEIER. Those slides were taken by Mr. Dwyer in his visit of Georgetown in, I believe, May 1978, and it was from that specific visit.

Mr. IRELAND. I see, and they were to give you a background 6 or 8 months later of what was going on and really, that was the purported only contact with what was going on?

Ms. SPEIER. Yes. I might also add that our Ambassador to Guyana, had never once made a trip to the Jonestown settlement in his entire tenure there as Ambassador. I find that unconscionable when you have 900 Americans living in that kind of a community, and there was so much controversy surrounding whether or not they were being held against their will, for him never to have made an onsite inspection.

Mr. IRELAND. I understand there was no record of any visit from that community to our Embassy, as well?

Ms. SPEIER. There were members from the Jonestown community who frequently came to Georgetown and the Embassy; who made charges and allegations about what the State Department or the U.S. Government, was doing to them such as harassment. They were much more mobile in terms of making contact with our Embassy—

Mr. IRELAND. Than the Embassy was?

Ms. SPEIER. Yes.

Mr. IRELAND. One last question about the Blakey report. You were aware of the Blakey report, of course, before you went, but it was my

understanding that being aware of it and the ramifications of it being as severe as they were, you came away with the impression that since nothing had been done, the allegations there must not have been true because the State Department had had it for a considerable amount of time and done nothing about it. Is that correct?

Ms. SPEIER. Yes. First of all, the affidavit was not an affidavit we ever saw. We were only told about the affidavit, and were told that the State Department had a copy of it. We presumed, as I said, erroneously that that affidavit had been reviewed and the charges found not to be accurate. I think we had a sense, as I'm sure many Members of Congress do, that the State Department is there to assist us, provide us with information we may not even know exists regarding a country or a certain issue or a problem we are investigating or looking into.

They were totally uncooperative in that respect. They gave us nothing. They led us to believe they knew nothing about Jonestown.

We had a briefing only days before we left. It was a briefing by the legal staff at State that I had personally requested myself. During that briefing the restrictions regarding the Privacy Act were made apparent to me. But one of the things many of those people said to me upon our leaving the meeting was, "After you've made the trip please come back and tell us what is happening there. We don't really know very much about what is going on down there." That kind of comment cannot be accurate when they had 900 documents in their possession at that time.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FASCELL. I just wanted to say at an appropriate time we will go into executive session and discuss some matters with Mr. Holsinger.

Mr. IRELAND. The gentleman from Alabama, we welcome you back. We are glad you are here.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. I have no questions at this time.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Holsinger, Ms. Speier.

Mr. Royer, if you would care to introduce the other witnesses?

Mr. ROYER. Yes; we have two other witnesses I would like to have come forward at the same time, Mr. Katsaris and also Mrs. Clare Bouquet, members of Concerned Relatives who have traveled all the way from California to be here. I think with your approval, Mr. Chairman, I would call upon Mr. Steven Katsaris first.

Mr. IRELAND. Welcome to the committee and proceed.

#### **STATEMENT BY STEVEN A. KATSARIS, A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF CONCERNED RELATIVES OF THE VICTIMS OF JONESTOWN**

Mr. KATSARIS. Thank you, Congressman, Mr. Chairman.

In the 15 months that have passed since Jonestown, there has not been a day when thoughts of that tragedy have not crept into my mind or been thrust upon me. There is still a lot of unfinished Jonestown business yet.

In the early months after Jonestown, there was media coverage to such an extent that one poll showed more people were aware of what happened in Guyana than of the dropping of the first atomic bomb.

During this time, a committee of the congressional staff members began an investigation and issued a report. The Department of State issued its own report. And then silence and apparently apathy on the part of our Government. Understandable in a sense, for who wants to be reminded of those morbid events. Better to attribute them to a strange set of circumstances that could never happen again. Yet, a U.S. Congressman was assassinated, members of the news media were murdered, and others, including my son, were seriously wounded at the Port Kaituma airstrip. In Jonestown itself, almost 1,000 Americans died, among them my daughter.

My thoughts have ranged from depression and a sense of profound personal loss to dismay over the apparent reluctance of our Government to probe with a full-scale investigation the facts and deeper implications of that singular event. Meanwhile, books are published with fact, fantasy, speculations, and accusations that need to be subjected to the searing light of a hard, comprehensive, and bold investigation. Otherwise, Jonestown will be surrounded with more myth, innuendo, and contorted conspiracy theories than the Kennedy and King assassinations and leave Americans even more cynical when it comes to trusting the ability and willingness of their elected officials to seek the truth.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee. There are questions that need to be asked, and I am trusting that you will ask them and demand responsible and full answers.

Why was the Department of State so timid in investigating the many charges made against People's Temple in the year preceding the tragedy? And is it really true that we are better prepared, as the State Department today claims, to respond to such situations today?

More than 6 months before Congressman Ryan went to Guyana the Concerned Relatives group issued a statement of charges of human rights violations of both United States and Guyanese law. Every charge made against People's Temple was proved true with one exception—there was no high fence surrounding the commune. They did not really need one. But people's mail was censored. Our relatives were being intimidated. They were subjected to mind control techniques. We could not make free contact with our family members in Jonestown. There were suicide rehearsals.

Officials in the Department of State were aware of all of our concerns. We asked for their help. And who were we? Not radicals nor ideologues who did not agree with Jim Jones' particular social ideas. We were parents and relatives with substantial evidence their loved ones were in danger. It would not have taken very much to check us out. It could have been easily ascertained we were responsible American citizens turning to their Government for a service it is supposed to provide. Yet, the response was negligible, an aloof hands-off position implying that it would be improper for the Department of State to be involved in family differences.

How does this contrast with other events involving the Department of State? Some months ago our Government detained a Russian airliner, with all passengers onboard, on the runway in New York for several days in an effort to make certain a ballerina truly wanted to return to Russia. All this in the middle of SALT II and the height of détente. Yet we were willing to confront Russia over the possibility that one person's human rights were being violated.

Why did the Department of State fail to respond in kind when it came to the human rights of almost 1,000 American citizens in Guyana? It is hard to believe that our national interests in Guyana precluded forceful representations on behalf of our relatives.

Consider also the following contrast: One Congressman and the media went to Jonestown and determined in a matter of hours something was wrong. People came forward and asked to leave that hell-hole. Yet, for over a year, our State Department assured us that conditions in Jonestown were satisfactory. We were told that representatives of our Embassy in Guyana regularly visited Jonestown and had determined that no one wanted to leave.

It does not appear unfair to draw the obvious conclusion that the Jonestown residents felt safer talking to a Congressman and the newsmen than to the Embassy staff in Guyana. Why?

Is it not our right to expect meaningful and practical assistance from the Department of State when there is evidence that our relatives abroad are in danger? In past months revelations have been made which if true indicate that the people I turned to for help at the Department of State and at our Embassy in Guyana knew far more of the insidious nature of Jonestown than they have admitted. Indeed, there is evidence that they too were subjected to the same pattern of lies, accusations, and manipulations that People's Temple used against us, the Concerned Relatives. Yet, in my three trips to Guyana and on my visits to the Department of State my appeals for help were handled by officials of the Department of State who gave me the impression they were more concerned with not rocking the boat than getting to the truth.

So much for the past performance of the Department of State. But what about now? I have read that the Department has undertaken a number of actions to remedy the situation. But what concrete plans really exist to react to similar situations today? It isn't enough to be aware today that such problems can arise, for the Department of State was aware of the situation long before the tragic day of November 18, 1978. What was lacking then was the ability of the State Department to receive information from Guyana, process it effectively, and in turn send back adequate guidance.

It also appears to me that we did not try to make use of the support systems that could have been provided by the Guyanese themselves. They do have a police force and a criminal investigation department. To my knowledge we did not even ask them to look into the situation.

American citizens have rights, even in foreign countries. In Guyana our Embassy could have explained to the residents of Jonestown their rights under Guyanese law. The failure to do so and the inability of our Embassy staff to project an image of being capable of protecting those rights of Americans certainly reinforced the impression on many who died that they were isolated, cut off and without a chance of help either from their host government, Guyana, or from the United States.

When I asked for help either from the officials at the Department of State when I came to Washington or from the embassy staff when I was in Guyana, I always felt frustration. I believed then that it was due to my failure to get them to understand and accept the strong evidence that something was terribly wrong in Jonestown. I no longer



believe that. My frustration has changed to disillusion and anger over the inability and unwillingness of the Department of State to act. I think there is adequate evidence today that they knew as much, even more than I, about the true conditions in Jonestown, but chose not to act. They decided to play it safe—safe for themselves, perhaps. Unfortunately, not for all those who died.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYER. Thank you, Mr. Katsaris. Now Mrs. Bouquet, please.

### **STATEMENT OF CLARE BOUQUET, A CONCERNED RELATIVE OF THE VICTIMS OF JONESTOWN**

Mrs. BOUQUET. I would like to express my gratitude to Congressman Royer and to the members of this subcommittee for giving me an opportunity to come here and for allowing me to speak to them on a subject which has, for some time, been very close to my heart. I believe I can speak for all the people who have been drawn close to each other in this tragedy when I say, "Please hear us!" I refer particularly to Beverly Oliver, who was asked to be here today, but is unable to leave the side of her husband, who became disabled by a stroke suffered in the Pegasus Hotel in Georgetown, Guyana on November 19, 1978. Beverly and Howard lost their two sons, their only children.

I want to especially thank Chairman Fascell for his kind words in his memorial address, delivered in Congress, in tribute to Leo Ryan. I quote from that address: "We pay tribute to a man who believed that every person was worth helping, and that every problem could, and should, be confronted." I implore all of you to confront the problem before us now, in the names of Leo Ryan, of my son Brian, and his wife, and of all the tragic victims of Jonestown.

Before I continue with my statement, I would like to share something with you that I experienced yesterday. This is my first visit to this beautiful city of Washington, D.C., and I have been walking and walking since I came. There is so much to see. And late yesterday afternoon I happened to go into the National Archives and I stood there in that very impressive place and looked at the faded documents there, and I felt kind of awed and I felt a certain pride and also a certain sadness. The pride was felt because this still is the best country there is, and I am very proud to be an American, but the sadness because I believe that some of the spirit of those documents has been somehow lost.

I want to say that the people in Jonestown, I feel, were some of the best that we had as Americans. They were idealistic people who really believed that all men are created equal, and that is what led them to their deaths in Guyana.

It has been 15 months since that day when over 900 Americans died in the jungle of Guyana. The shock and horror experienced by those of us who went to Guyana to attempt to see our family members and, if possible, bring them home, is still with us and I think always will be.

Some segments of our society have dismissed them as a bunch of crazy fanatics, or a grotesque spectacle. But someone loved each one of them. They went to Guyana looking for some sort of promised land, and found themselves prisoners in hell.

The problem before us now, I believe, is discovering the real truth about what happened in Guyana. I think it has been oversimplified and it may take a very long time to unfold. However, I for one will not rest until I know for sure what really happened. I personally contributed 86 pages of testimony to the staff investigative group of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I know of several others who did the same thing. Yet our specific testimony is included only in a classified edition of the report, which has not been available to any of us. All we received was the unclassified version, a 37-page work with only very general statements about our testimony. The report states on page 29, and I quote, and this is the same quote Jackie had. I guess we were thinking along the same lines.

The U.S. Embassy in Guyana did not demonstrate adequate initiative, sensitive reaction to, and appreciation of progressively mounting indications of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown.

On page 39 it says, "Absent in the Embassy's dealings with People's Temple were the vital elements of commonsense and an honest and healthy skepticism." We are talking about the loss of 914 lives, including a U.S. Congressman, not a simple mistake. The frustration I personally feel and felt, and I am certain others paralleled me in their attempts to get help, is overwhelming. I turned to everyone I could think of in any position of authority, from the President right down to direct appeals to the Embassy officials in Georgetown, Guyana, dating back to March 1978, 9 months before my son was finally killed.

I myself mailed copies of the affidavits of Yolanda Crawford and Debbie Layton Blakey, both of whom escaped from Jonestown, to Mr. Ellice, the U.S. consul in Guyana. I asked in July 1978, for a team of inspectors to be sent into Jonestown to stay for several days in order to accurately assess what was really true. I even sent a recent picture of my son and his wife, which I have with me, so that there would be no mistake about who the embassy officials were talking to, and so that they would know what they looked like before they left this country. I was told in writing by two consular officials, Mr. McCoy and Mr. Ellice, that a visit to Jonestown would occur about the end of August. No one actually went there until November 7, 1 week before Leo Ryan's previously announced visit, along with the rest of us, to Guyana.

On Thursday, November 16, the day our group had an appointment with the ambassador, I called the embassy to inquire from Mr. Ellice why I had heard nothing since August. I was told by him that a visit had been made, and that a letter had been mailed to me at home. As we walked into the embassy at 2, I was handed a letter regarding the November 7 visit to Jonestown, with Mr. Ellice's comment that evidently someone had "forgotten" to mail it.

In the State Department's own report on their performance in Guyana it states that quarterly visits had been set up to Jonestown, due to the allegations against the Temple. Why, then, did no one go out there for 6 months? I have heard it said that the trips were "delayed". What embassy business could possibly have been more urgent than a threat to the lives and well being of over 900 Americans? The State Department points the finger at the embassy for, and I quote from the Foreign Affairs report, "the lamentable breakdown in communica-

tions" and the embassy points back at the State Department. Where does the buck stop?

Who exactly is responsible? I think it's very commendable that the State Department is now implementing the recommendations of that committee's report by doing threat assessments before a Congressman visits a foreign country, by training consular officials in the psychological aspects of mind control, and so forth. But that won't help Leo or Brian or Maria Katsaris or any of the rest of them.

Finally, I would like to ask why, although I realize that the circumstances were somewhat different, were the lives of our hostages, including over 250 innocent children, not equally as important as those of the hostages in Iran? Why were they slaughtered without any help from anyone except one very brave Congressman? What will it take to put the puzzle together? When are we, in this country, going to start thinking about people as our No. 1 priority, rather than oil? I'd rather get a horse any day than give up any of my children.

I ask this subcommittee to assist us in our pursuit of the whole truth of the story of Guyana.

Again, I wish to thank Congressman Royer and his able staff for their interest and assistance, and I thank this subcommittee in advance for the help which I feel sure they will not deny us.

Thank you.

Mr. IRELAND. The gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to thank the witnesses for their testimony, which is very moving and which makes a very strong case. May I say, as one member of the subcommittee, but I think I speak for all of the members, there is nothing more important that the State Department has to do than to see to the lives and welfare of American citizens. This is their business, and it is first and foremost.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Royer.

Mr. ROYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of quick questions.

I wonder, Mrs. Bouquet, you did mention about sending the documents to the State Department, the affidavits?

Mrs. BOUQUET. Yes, I did, Mr. Royer.

Mr. ROYER. I am wondering, did you get a response back from them?

Mrs. BOUQUET. Yes, I have the response right there.

Mr. ROYER. Could you quickly summarize that? Not in full detail, but what was the response?

Mrs. BOUQUET. As you can see, I have quite a few documents.

[Pause.]

Mr. ROYER. Mr. Katsaris, while she is looking for that, maybe you would want to be thinking for a few minutes. The question I wanted to ask you is about some of your experiences a little more directly and some of the frustrations you found. I know that you made three different trips, and it seems to me you might cover that in just a little more detail.

Mr. KATSARIS. On my first trip to Guyana, I came to Washington, D.C. first. I visited the State Department and talked with the head of the Guyanese desk. I went to the Guyanese Embassy. I made several other contacts to prepare the way so that the embassy officials would help me when I got down there.



When I got there, the consular officer, Richard McCoy, was expecting me. It turned out that the People's Temple had sent a representative there to defame me, to give them a message from my daughter that she did not want to see me. I asked if Mr. McCoy would accompany me into the jungle to see Maria. I told them there must be something definitely wrong because my daughter was not like that. I showed him her most recent letters where she told me she missed me and was concerned about my health. I had been scheduled for some surgery at that time, anything but what they had told them at the embassy about me. I got nowhere.

Mr. ROYER. You were on that trip by yourself?

Mr. KATSARIS. I was on that trip by myself. A month later I convinced Ambassador Mann, the Guyanese Ambassador to the United States, to arrange a visit between my daughter and me. We went to Guyana and eventually, after a long delay, they brought my daughter in from the jungle. They did not permit me to see her alone, but Richard McCoy from our Embassy was there and also Ambassador Mann was there and other representatives from the People's Temple.

I was devastated by that visit with my daughter. She was paranoid, obviously had been sleep-deprived. She was filled with wild accusations of what I had done to destroy the People's Temple commune. There had been a radical change in her personality.

When I got to the airport that day—I left the same day after waiting a whole week to see my daughter—I was truly in fear that what I had done might have jeopardized her life. I knew they were going to take her back into the jungle. I got no indication from Dick McCoy or the ambassador they would help me try to get her out of the country.

I got to the airport in Guyana and Dick McCoy had a message for me at the Pan Am desk to call him. I called him and he said, "I didn't get a chance to see you before you left. I stayed back to talk with Ambassador Mann, and both of us are convinced something dreadfully wrong is going on here, something is very strange about all of that today. I will write a full report to State and send you a copy." Those are direct quotes, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. ROYER. Do you remember that date? What was that date?

Mr. KATSARIS. That was November 4, 1977.

Mr. ROYER. That was a full year prior to the tragedy?

Mr. KATSARIS. That was a full year prior to that. After that I was in communication by telephone and letter with Richard McCoy. I had made numerous trips to the State Department. I was one of the organizers of the Concerned Relatives. I personally sent the State Department a copy of our 17-page document detailing what we believed was the actual situation in Guyana.

Mr. ROYER. Thank you, Mr. Katsaris.

Mrs. Bouquet?

Mrs. BOUQUET. Yes, Mr. Royer. I found a copy of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Ellice on July 18 in which I said—

Mr. ROYER. July 18 of what year?

Mrs. BOUQUET. 1978. I said:

I am sending you some material on this organization, which I hope may be helpful to you in assessing the situation. The two enclosed affidavits have been sent to the U.S. State Department, but it appears to be very difficult to get any help, perhaps due to the fact that the People's Temple is a "religion."

do something. That has to start at every level—at the top, in Congress, and with the people at the lower level. When faced with

Then I have a response here. I had received Mr. Ellice's name from someone in Guyana with whom I had been put in touch through a friend of mine in San Francisco who was trying to find out what he could about the People's Temple, and he sent me the name of Mr. Ellice. And Mr. McCoy evidently was still there because I received a letter from him on August 2 in which he said:

DEAR MRS. BOUQUET: I refer to your letter of July 18 concerning your son Brian. I am departing Guyana in the near future. However, my successor, Mr. Douglas Ellice, is planning a visit to the People's Temple agricultural community later this month. During his visit Mr. Ellice will arrange a personal private meeting with your son. He will inform you of the results of his visit.

I would like to say also at the same time I wrote my first letter to the Prime Minister of Guyana asking for help, I sent copies to President Carter, Secretary Vance, Leo Ryan, the Ambassador from Guyana to Washington, Mr. Lawrence Mann, and to Mr. Paul McCloskey. And I do wish to say that Mr. McCloskey also responded to me and he sent a letter. His office advised that I send a personal letter to my son through his office in Washington to be hand-delivered by the Embassy in Guyana, which was delivered to my son on November 7. That letter was sent in June.

Mr. ROYER. Again, what year?

Mrs. BOUQUET. 1978. I know Mr. McCloskey forwarded the letter to them and it was held up until they went out there in November. But Mr. Ellice wrote and said that he did give my son the letter, and that letter is dated November 8, 1978. That is the one he handed me as we walked into the Embassy.

Mr. ROYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my questions. I did have a couple of requests I would like to make. If they're inappropriate, I hope you will let me know.

I would like to ask unanimous consent to have the Olivers, whom I had hoped to have here today but cannot be here due to the ill health of Mr. Oliver, I would like unanimous consent that they be allowed to put their testimony in writing within a fixed time.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection.

Mr. ROYER. I would also like to ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, if it's possible for those of us who testified today, including myself, to have an opportunity to extend and revise our remarks.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, that certainly will be done.

Mr. ROYER. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me say, Mr. Royer, we express our appreciation to you for your perseverance and dedication on this matter. We are happy to have the opportunity to work with you.

As for Mr. Katsaris and Mrs. Bouquet, both of you have presented very thoughtful statements. They were certainly penetrating with respect to the assessments of the responsibility, in a broad general way for this horrible tragedy. The events themselves determined responsibility. In the final analysis, the entire Government has some responsibility. Whoever they are, the individuals who were involved in this process, they are all responsible to some degree.

As far as the general cast of the statements which have been made, you are quite accurate. It has been a difficult job, and our subcommittee has done its best. Certainly there has not been anything comparable to this particular tragedy, but we have had others which were quite

bad where we have been struggling to provide the attitudinal sensitivity required in a large bureaucracy to deal with these problems; and that is difficult at best. You can always say the guy at the top is responsible. It's his job and something should have happened. And it is true. But it is extremely difficult where there are several thousand people involved, and all kinds of communications are required, as well as actions. Commonsense would dictate certainly on review that something which should have been done wasn't done.

So we have been trying to get the sensitivity inculcated throughout the Department. That is a big job. You are talking about a lot of people. We have been reasonably successful. That is about all I can say.

I would like to say we have been eminently successful but we have not been, because the entire issue of the protection of Americans abroad and the ability of the U.S. Government to respond is diffuse. It is spotty and it is subject to a great deal of criticism. It has been for some time.

We are trying to change all of that. You are, too. We hope that we will have more success in increasing the capability of the State Department which is in the forefront in foreign countries in carrying out that responsibility. Admittedly, it is difficult. There are a lot of reasons with which all of us are familiar. None of those should stand in the way it seems to me. That is the position that our subcommittee has taken consistently, and we will just keep pressing and pushing.

I say all of that because my experience tells me that no matter how hard we try, we are not going to achieve an overnight miracle. It will take perseverance on our part and on the part of other Americans. And I do not believe the responsibility is just yours because you have suffered the loss of loved ones. It is not. It is the responsibility of all Americans to decide exactly what the response of the American Government will be and to make that meaningful, sensible and quick because we have not had an appropriate response by our Government in a great many cases.

This problem has been a common thread. It has been running through hearings we have been holding now for a good many years. Every time we have a case that comes before us we try to provide a forum and make a record in order to delineate the problem. We could have done without that because there is ample media record and public knowledge. But we wanted an official record and that is why we have been doing all of this, taking testimony and holding hearings. We'll probably continue to do this. That is why we are interested in pursuing the implementation of the recommendations to the best of our ability.

We will explore whatever changes in law are necessary. We have been doing that over a long period of time. We have even made changes in the law to give the Department greater capability than that which they said they were able to muster. We have provided additional money where necessary in areas where we felt the Department ought to have the capability to respond.

Speaking specifically with respect to this tragedy, I don't know that we can provide a visible, identifiable mechanism that would satisfy you, because we are talking about the Department's total capability, which is another way of saying the commitment of the United States to do something. That has to start at every level—at the top, in Congress, and with the people at the lower level. When faced with

the problem, they ought to have commonsense to do something but a lot of times that doesn't happen. You call it a human failure if you want to, or a lack of commonsense. We have run across that many times, and we have been trying to deal with that problem in a broad, general way. We have been trying to provide incentives for better people and to provide them the necessary money to attract better people.

This is not an indictment of the entire personnel system. It is just a fact of life that we are trying to improve that capability. The biggest problem we have had throughout this whole thing is what I call the commonsense attitudinal problem that should not permit something to go so far along that it ends up in a horrible tragedy of this kind. The fact that it happened in this case demonstrates beyond any question that something is wrong, and it speaks for itself that it is wrong.

So the culpability is fixed. And we are going to have to do our best now to try to look to improve whatever we have in our system so that it never happens again, if that's at all possible. This is what we are trying to do.

We want to thank you and the others who have testified here. We cannot share in your loss in any way, but we can certainly feel it. We feel it very deeply. As responsible officials, we want to bear our share of responsibility to do whatever we can to answer all of the questions which you have asked. I say that in a broad, general way because a lot of those questions cannot really be answered, I am sorry to say. I don't know of any way to get those questions answered specifically. It is a fact, unfortunately.

So we are not sweeping anything under the rug. We are doing our best and will continue to do our best to try and improve the entire response mechanism of the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of State.

I want to thank all of you and the families of those who have made the trip here to be with this subcommittee. When we can pinpoint a specific change in law we have had no opposition, and with Mr. Royer's help we will keep doing the best we can.

I want to thank you again. This is not a personal matter. As I see it, what you are doing here, all of you who have come and testified or who worked on an investigating group, are trying to do something for your country, as well as for the individuals who have been lost.

What we would like to do now, if we can, is ask you to please leave the hearing room. We want to go into executive session with Mr. Holsinger on some matters. If there is any way of making them public, we will. I don't know that we can. Under our rules we are required, if it involved any allegations against an individual or group of individuals, it requires us to go into executive session to receive that testimony. That is the only reason we are doing it.

Mr. ROYER. Mr. Chairman, while they are leaving, as I understand the schedule after this, it will be March 4 for the State Department hearings?

Mr. FASCELL. That is our present intention, yes.

[Whereupon, the hearing in open session was concluded, to resume in executive session.]